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Can Community Clinics Survive? 
A Comparative Study of Law Centres in 
Australia, Ontario and England 
FREDERICK H. ZEMANS AND ANEURIN THOMAS 
Introduction 
This Chapter grows out of the authors' research into contemporary developments 
in legal aid in Canada and the international environment. It focuses particularly 
on community clinics and their equivalents jn Australia, Ontario and England. All 
three jurisdictions have adapted the American store-front legal clinic model to the 
needs and legal cultures of their society. Jn Ontario and England, legal aid has 
been dominated by the judicare system, emphasising the case-by-case delivery of 
legal services by private members of the legal profession (Zemans, 1994). 
J\.ustralia has a mixed model, in which over half of individual casework is dealt 
with by salaried lawyers in legal aid!. commissions (Fleming, 1994; Crockett, 
1994). However, community-based organisations, variously called 'community 
legal centres' in Australia, 'legal clinics' in Ontario· and ' law centres' in the United 
Kingdom, have made a contribution to legal aid services that is out of proportion 
to the resources devoted to them (Kuras, 1994; Stephens, 1991; OLAFS, 1991). 
Here we look at each jurisdiction in turn. We start by examining the history of 
these clinics and their progressive roots. We then consider their present activities 
and future in a world in which governments increasingly emphasjse centralised 
decision-making and control. Governments now speak the language of priorities, 
cost-effectiveness, financial and operational accountability, quality assurance and 
co-ordination. Centres perceive such demands for accountability as a threat to 
their independence. They fear a profound change, that will jeopardise their 
community roots and hamper innovation. We ask whether strategies arc available 
to allow clinics to retain their independence and uniqueness in the face of these 
pressures to 'bureaucratise'. 
Australia 
Out of the three jurisdictions, Australia has the most generous provision. In 1997, 
there were 151 community legal centres, or 8.1 centres for every nrillion people 
,, 
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(NACLC, 1997).1 This compares to 6.4 centres per million population in Ontario 
and a mere 1.1 in Rngland.2 
The first centre, Fitzroy Legal Service, was established in 1973. At the heart 
of the movement to develop community legal centres was a fundamental disen-
chantment with the manner in which traditional legal services dealt with the 
disadvantaged of society which was placing a particular emphasis on individuals 
and a case-by-case approach (Basten et al., 1983; Chesterman, 1996). Inspired by 
a commitment to equality before the law and a belief that social and structural 
change could be achieved through the legal system and community-based 
activism, centres sought to dismantle the barriers faced by the poor in securing 
access to justice. Consequently, their work has focused on disadvantaged indi-
viduals and groups within Australian society. 
AustraHan community legal centres may be defined as community-based and 
community-managed organisations, structured to provide 'free, accessible and 
easy to understand legal services .. .' (NACLC, 1996). To combat the economic 
barriers, the early legal centres offered free legal advice to their clients. Although 
community legal centres lacked sufficient resources to provide extensive litiga-
tion services, they provided support in the form of advice and education for 
clients engaged in litigation. Some centres were able to finance public interest or 
test cases with legal aid funds from the state Legal Aid Commissions. Cases were 
selected on their capacity to benefit the greatest munber of people in a client 
group and on the requirement of a reasonable chance of success.3 
Client involvement was central to the community legal centre movement's ideol-
ogy. It was intended to overcome the sense of powerlessness of those confronting 
the legal system. The community legal centres also established networks of people 
facing similar problems, with the intention of reJieving the sense of isolation felt by 
many disadvantaged clients and facilitating a view of their problems which encom-
passed the broader social context.4 Leaders of the community legal centre move-
ment saw the formation of community groups and organisations as a vehicle for 
solidaiity with the capacity to create community campaigns and social movements 
addressing the social problems facing their clients. As well, the community legal 
centre served as a resource for the community, providing assistance and advice. 
1 This does not include the 23 Aboriginal and Torres Stait ls1ander legal aid services, which are 
managed and funded entirely separately and tend to concentrate on criminal law issues. These partic-
ular services are outside the scope of our study. 
2 However, English law centres are larger. While Australian centres have an average of 6.2 full 
and parf-lime staff per centre, English law centres have 8.9 (NACLC, 1997; personal communication 
with Law Centres Federation, London). 
3 
. This practice has generally been limited to some of the specialist centres such as the Consumer 
Credit Legal Services, the Disability Discrimination and Welfare Rights services and the 
Environmental Defenders Office. See National Association of Community Legal Centres, 1996. 
4 For example, landlord-tenant disputes were a common class of problems faced by clients of 
community legal centres. These disputes arose from the fact that in many jurisdictions in Australia 
there was inadequate low-cost housing and furthermore, tenancy laws generally were overwhelming 
in favour of the landlord. See Basten, Graycar and Neal, 1983:180. 
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Many of their features were perceived as radical at the time of their development, 
including informal physical surroundings, accessible opening hours, group work, 
community legal education, law reform and a heavy reliance on volunteers. They 
have been typified as adhering to notions of 'grass-roots ·level organization, 
community control, empowering the recipient, de-professionalisation, human rights 
... free access to services ' (Basten et at., 1983:179). In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
conununity legal centres' programme roots and radical style of delivery prompted 
conflict with the private profession due to fears of loss of work and income 
(Cheste1man, 1996). Relations with governments have also been heated at times. 
Nevertheless, although conflict persists over funding levels to community legal 
centres, they have finally been accepted by the profession and governments as inte-
gral to the legal aid infrastructure. 
Commonwealth and state governments provide the overwhelming majority of 
funding.5 Despite this, centres have always stressed their independence, from 
both government and the legal profession. Originally, decisions were made by the 
membership, a broad concept that included not only volunteers and employees 
but also members of the community. During the formative stages of Fitzroy Legal 
Services, for example, extensive open meetings were held for all members 
(Chesterman, 1996). However, the ideal of community control, central to the 
centres' 01iginal mandate, has not been fully realised (Basten et al., 1983: 180). 
Centres have progressed from relying almost entirely on volunteers to being 
employing organisations. As a result, the character of centres has changed and 
paid staff have become the dominant decision-makers. Despite this, there contin-
ues to be a strong reliance on volunteers, including not only volunteer lawyers, 
but also social workers, paralegals and students. The National Association of 
Community Legal Centres (1997:31) calculates that on average each centre has 
two to three solicitors, three or four other pa.id staff and 21 volunteers.6 
Centres have been defined by two different notions of community. Generalist 
centres are organised with reference lo communities defined by geographical 
boundaiies and offer services covering most areas of non-commercial law. 
Specialist centres are organised around communities of common interest (such as 
tenants, young people, refugees, women or consumers) and provide services 
designed to deal with problems in these areas. While generalist centres tend to 
concentrate on referral, information, advice and education, the specialist centres 
conduct more test cases and carry out significant law refo1m activities (OLAFS, 
1991). 
5 In 1995/96, community legal centres' income totalled approximately AS$19 million of which 
the Commonwealth contributed AS$15 million and state governments most of the remainder 
(Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1997:33). 
6 Data is drawn from a survey of 140 centres for a professional indemnity scheme. Between 
them the 140 centres employed 316 full or part-time solicitors, 554 full or part-time other staff and 
used 3,004 volunteers. The involvement of volunteers is much greater than in the UK, where law 
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Table 3.1: Legal Centres across Australia in 1992 
State No. of No. of No. of 
cenlres centres per specialist 
m. pop. centres 
Victoria 38 9.0 15 (39%) 
New South Wales 24 4.1 16 (67%) 
Queensland 18 6.0 10 (56%) 
South AustraLia 7 4.8 1 (14%) 
Weslern Auslralia 10 6.1 5 (50%) 
Tasmania 5 10.7 1 (20%) 
Aust. Capital Terr. 1 3.4 1 (JOO%) 
Northern T~rritory l 6.0 0 
Total 104 49 (47%) 
Source: Williams ( 1992: 293) 
The various Australian states differ markedly in their mix of specialist and 
generalist centres. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of community legal centres in 
1992, illustrating the differing state traditions when it comes to funding centres . 
Victoria leads the way, though Tasmania is generous in propo1tion to its small 
population. In New South Wales the specialist tradition predominates. South 
Australia, on the other hand, has little in the way of specialist provision, and lacks 
the same culture of educational or reform work. In Western Australia, centres take 
what has been termed a 'social-work' approach, motivated by a strong suspicion 
of lawyers. 
Despite these differences, however, there are many common threads. Across 
all centres, assistance to individuals is a major, and often predominant, aspect of 
centres' work. Centres estimate that, collectively, they assist approximately 
300,000 people annually (NACLC, 1997). A government study of four centres 
carried out in the 1990s found that 26-48 per cent of time was spent on advice, 
representation and referrals to other agencies. Community legal education took 
8-16 per cent of time, law and administrative reform 6-14 per cent and adminis-
tration and service development 19-54 per cent (OLAFS, 1991: 100-1). 
However, although the time allocation was relatively low, all four centres carried 
out an impressive range of community education work. They prepared guides and 
newsletters, gave local talks and courses and even produced radio programmes. 
Increasingly, centres arc co-operating in such activities and implementing 
programmes through State Federations and working groups. 
The pressing question is how far community legal centres will be able to 
survive the change of political cultures implicit in the rise of the 'New Right'. 
Centres developed as part of the expansion of the welfare state, whereas now: 
'The ideology of the "neo-conservative" New Right rejects the concept of the 
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welfare state, takes the rhetoric of individualism literally and downplays the prob-
able adverse social and political consequences of the "conflictual order" it advo-
cates' (Jayasuriya, 1996:19-20). 
With a growing focus on economic rationalisation, the desire of governments 
to 'balance the budget' seems to apply regardless of which political party is in 
power. Social spending has been cut and programmes abandoned, reduced or 
transferred to the private sector. With cuts to welfare and other social 
programmes, the gap between the rich and the poor in Australian society has 
increased and more and more fall below the poverty line (Jayasuriya, 1996; 
Noone, 1997). 
Despite the rise of the New Right, however, community legal centres have 
fared reasonably well for most of the last ten years, securing increased official 
recognition. In 1987, for example, the Labor Commonwealth Government 
created the National Legal Aid Advisory Committee (NLAAC) to advise the 
Minister responsible for legal aid. The Committee, which undertook a compre-
hensive review of the Australian legal aid system, published its final report in 
1990 calling for the Commonwealth Government to take a more active leadership 
in the provision of legal aid (NLAAC, 1990). It was positive about the role of 
centres, and reconunended improved access for the socially excluded, such as 
social security claimants, homeless young people and prisoners. 
Shortly thereafter the Minister of Justice and the Commonwealth Attorney-
Gcncral formed the Access to Justice Advisory Committee to 'make recommen-
dations for reform of the administration of the Commonwealth Justice and legal 
system to enhance access to justice and render the system fairer, more efficient 
and more effective' (AJAC, 1994). When, in 1994, this Committee released its 
rcpo1t, it also affirmed the notion that the Commonwealth should play a leader-
ship role as the major funder of Australian legal aid. It endorsed the work of 
community legal centres and caUed for more programmes designed to provide 
community legal education, telephone advice and legal training for community 
and social workers (AJAC, 1994). 
Alongside these endorsements came a steady increase in funding. The number 
of centres rose from 104 in 1992 to 151 in 1996. The Labor Government 
responded to the report with the Justice Statement of May 1995, by announcing 
that national funding of legal aid would increase by $68 million over a four year 
period, including an additional $14 million for law centres. The introduction 
stated that: 'The Commonwealth will also assert its proper role and authority as 
the major provider of legal aid funding. It will ensure that community needs 
regarding legal assistance are addressed fairly and efficiently, and that legal aid 
policies are oriented to meet community expectations' (Government of Australia, 
1995: 1). 
It recogni~ed the impo1tance of community legal centres and endorsed the 
principle of community control: 'The government recognises that community 
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effectiveness and accessibility and will continue to support and foster this funda-
mental characteristic through community participation and development' 
(Government of Australia, 1995:109). 
Implementation of the new package, however, was interrupted by the election 
of a new Conservative Government in March 1996. At first, the legal aid system 
seemed reasonably secure but the climate soon changed. Regan explains that: 
In the election policy statements the then Opposition pledged to 'maintain current levels 
of legal aid funding as well as funding to community legal centres'. Legal Aid 
Commissions were therefore shocked when, in the August budget, the new government 
announced its decision to cut legal aid expenditures. The proposed $33 million cut for each 
of the following three years represented approximately 20% of the Commonwealth expen-
diture, a drastic reduction by any measure. Surprisingly, instead of Attorney General Daryl 
Williams arguing that legal aid was ineffective, or inefficient, he argued that the cut was 
part of his Department's cont.J.ibution to the new government's debt reduction strategy 
(Regan, 1997). 
While the brunt of the cuts fell on the official legal aid commissions, community 
legal centres experienced a smaller but significant cut of 4 per cent of common-
wealth funding over the next two years. The additional monies promised by the 
Justice Statement were also cut. Needless to say, the cuts created difficulties for 
many centres, though none was forced to close. 
Governments are not only reducing funding, but are also increasing manager-
ial control. So far, the main effect has been felt within the legal aid commissions 
but pressure is also mounting on community legal centres. In 1995, the Attorney-
General of Victoria introduced legislation which transformed the state legal aid 
commission into Victoria Legal Aid, a body which is corporate in structure and 
function. The old commission included representatives from a wide range of 
those concerned with legal services: the legal profession, community legal 
centres, salaried legal aid staff and the Council for Social Services. These were 
removed from Victoria Legal Aid, which was stTuctured to provide greater effi-
ciency and control (Noone, 1997:27). Meanwhile the Commonwealth and state 
governments have begun joint reviews of community legal centres in three states 
'with a view to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations' 
(Keys Young, 1997). Governments may, in the future, rationalise centres and 
intervene in their activities more than they have to date. 
Australian community legal centres are a success story. Until very recently, 
they have managed surprisingly well in the darkening economic and political 
clima~e. However, things are now taking a distinct turn for the worse. While the 
Commonwealth Government may endorse community participation in commu-
nity legal centres, recent developments in the legal aid system indicate that the 
measure of success is the quantity of legal services purchased for every dollar 
(Noone, 1997:28). Community legal centres will have to compete for decreasing 
funding with the private profession, with commissions, with other welfare organ-
isations and with each other. At the same time, poverty is increasing and legal aid 
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conunissions have fewer resources to help people in need. Community legal 
centres find their workloads rising at a time when their own resources are declin-
ing. Finally, the movement towards both more 'corporate l*~' structures for the 
administration of legal aid and to national planning, thi'eatens the community 
basis of the legal centres' movement. This restricts the voice of the community 
and lessens the ability of the disadvantaged to express their views and to effect 
change thrnugh the system (Noone, 1997:29). 
Ontario 
If Australia's community legal centres have been successful, Ontatio's have been 
even more so. Ontatio's 1967 Legal Aid Act established a statutory light to legal 
aid and acknowledged the obligation of the government to individuals who could 
not afford a lawyer. The Act was premised on a desire to make the same legal 
services available to the poor as were already available to 'fee-paying' clients. 
Legal services were to be delivered through the judicare model, using private 
lawyers as service providers. The Act effectively established legal aid as a govern-
ment-funded social programme for the poor. 
The Act also set out the basic governance and management structure of the 
Ontario Plan, specifying that the Law Society would administer and determine 
policy for the Plan, and establishing with accompanying regulations, its coverage 
and basic financial eligibility criteria. The Plan was embraced by the profession. 
Approximately half of all Ontario lawyers registered their names on legal aid 
panels to be called if their services were required. The Plan was also embraced by 
the public, and both the number of certificates issued by and the total costs of the 
Plan grew considerably dw'ing this period. 
Despite the growing number of certificates, in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
many lawyers and social activists concluded that poor people often had much 
different legal needs from 'fee-paying' clients. These analysts bel ieved that judi-
care lawyers were not qualified to address the legal needs of the poor (Taman, 
1971 :9). As a result, a different delivery model was required: the community legal 
aid clinic, a model based on the American neighbourhood legal clinic. As in 
Australia, early community clinics were guided by five principles: a strong focus 
on the legal needs of the poor; community involvement in decision-making; inde-
pendence from government and the Law Society-controlled Ontario Legal Aid 
Plan (OLAP); a broad definition of 'legal services', including law reform, public 
legal education and community development; and rel iance on staff lawyers and 
non-lawyers to deliver services. 
The early clinics' radical focus was reflected in their governance structure and 
staffing poli~ies. Clinics were governed by 'conununity boards of directors' and 
were staffed by a combination of salaried lawyers and saladed 'community legal 
workers'. The community legal worker concept was new to the province. Neither 
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lawyers nor administrative staff, 'CLWs' were primarily community organisers 
whose focus was community legal education, law reform and community devel-
opment. 
The first community legal aid clinic in Ontario was established in 1971.7 The 
early clinics were established outside of the existing OLAP management st.ruc-
tttre and funded by a variety of charitable and government grants. As a result, the 
clinics had a considerable degree of independence. At this ti me, the clinics were 
not formally organised into a 'clinic system'. 
As the number of clinics grew, pressure mounted on the provincial government 
to provide them with funding. As a result, the provincial Attorney General 
appointed a Task Force on Legal Aid in 1973. Officially recognising the validity 
of the clinic approach to legal services for the poor, the 1974 Task Force Report 
on Legal Aid (the Osler Report) recommended a 'mixed' delivery system for legal 
aid in which the existing judicare system would be supplemented by staffed 
neighbourhood legal clinics funded by the provincial government. Mr Justice 
Osler noted that 'the poor have many problems peculiarly their own ... [the poor] 
are tenants not landlords, debtors not creditors, pu1·chasers not vendors' (Osler 
Report, 1974:39). More precisely their needs have been seen as relating to hous-
ing law, income maintenance law (including welfare, fami ly benefits, employ-
ment insurance, Canada Pensions, and workers compensation); work-related 
issues (including employment standards and occupational health and safety); and 
consumer and debt problems. Like other areas of law, the interpretation of the 
complex statutory and regulatory schemes in these fields often depends on legal 
assistance. 
The provincial government accepted the Osler Report's clinic recommenda-
tions. In 1976, a regulation under the Legal Aid Act established funding for the 
existing twenty-two legal aid clinics in the province (Ontario Regulation, 1976). 
In 1978, Mr Justice Samuel Grange conducted another provincial inquiry into 
legal aid, intended to examine the relationship between the c1inics, OLAP, and the 
private bar. Like the Osler Report, the Report of the Commission on Clinical 
Funding (the Gra1ige Report) affomed the mjxed delivery system of 1egal aid in 
Ontario, concluding that community clinics played a significant role in Ontario's 
legal aid system. (Grange Report, 1978) The Report found that the clientele and 
legal issues addressed by the certificate programme and clinic programme were 
very different. As a result, the Report viewed the relationship between clinics and 
the private bar as one of co-operation, not competition, encouraging the growth 
of clinics to complement the services provided by the private bar under judicare. 
Importantly, the Report concluded that clinics should have 'autonomy with 
respect to policy and administration, subject only to accountability for the public 
7 Parkdale Community Legal Services was a pilol project funded by the Federal Department of 
Health and Welfare, the Council for Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, and York 
University (Zemans, 1997). 
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funds advanced and for the legal competence of the services rendered' (Grange 
Report, 1978:22). Policy and administrative autonomy were considered necessary 
to ensure community control and preserve the clinics' law·reform mandate. 
In 1979, the Grange Report's recommendations were incorporated into a regu-
lation of the Legal Aid Act establishing the structure of provincial funding for 
clinics. The 'Clinic Funding Regulation' attempted to preserve clinic autonomy 
by effectively dividing the governance of community legal clinics between the 
Law Society's Clinic Funding Committee (CFC) and volunteer, elected commu-
nity Boards of Directors specific to each c1inic. The CFC, like the Legal Aid 
Committee, is a Standing Corrunittee of the Law Society, separate from the Legal 
Aid Committee, responsible for establishing policy and guidelines in respect of 
the funding of clinics and administering the clinic funding programme (Ontatio 
Regulation, 1990). The clinics' operational policies-including determination of 
case priorities , other activities and financial eligibility-are intended to be deter-
mined by democratically elected, volunteer Boards of Directors. The Regulation 
attempts to preserve clinic autonomy by establishing a complicated series q_f 
checks and balances between the CFC and the clinic funding staff (CFS). Initial 
funding decisions are made by the CFS but are ultimately detennined by the CFC 
(Ontario Regulation, 1990). Distanced from the application process, the CFC 
hears appeals of funding decisions (Mossman, 1983). 
There are currently seventy cHnics in Ontario, serving over 100 communities; 
there cu·e two main categories of clinics: general and specialty clinics. Fifty-six 
clinics are general service clinics, offering services in core areas of poverty law 
practice. Fourteen clinics are specialty clinics which specialise in a particular area 
· of law or in the legal needs of a specific client group, such as the Advocacy Centre 
for the Elderly, the Advocacy Resource Centre for the Handicapped, Justice for 
Children and Youth, the Centre for Spanish-Speaking Peoples, the Canadian 
Environmental Law Association and university clinics.8 Ontaiio also has three 
clinics affiliated with university law schools in the province: the CotTectional 
Law Project (Queen's University), Legal Assistance of Windsor (University of 
Windsor) and Parkdale Community Legal Services (Osgoode Hall Law School).9 
In 1996, clinics canicd 37,097 files, provided summary advice in 147,636 
poverty law matters, made approximately 70,000 referrals to social services, 
community agencies or private lawyers, conducted 2,055 public legal education 
sessions (reaching more than 72,000 people) and presented 792 briefs or 
8 The list of specialty clinics also includes: Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto, Community 
Legal Education Ontario, Correctional Law Project, Industrial Accident Victims Group of Ontario, 
Injured Workers' Consultant, Landlord's Self-Help Centre, Metro Tenants Legal Services, Metro 
Toronto Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic, Pay Equity Advocacy and Legal Services, Metro 
Toronlo Chinese and Southeast Legal Clinic, Pay Equity and Legal Services and Toronto Worker's 
Health and Safety Legal Clinic. 
9 Law students in these programmes complete a one-term placement in the clinic, earning acad-
emic credits while undertaking practical clinical work. 
r 
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submissions in court or tribunal cases. LO They also produced videos and 
pamphlets, pursued law reform initiatives and launched community develop-
ment projects which assist clients to organise and to form self-help groups 
focused on low-income issues, including injured workers and tenant associa-
tions (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1992:7). Simple case totals, however, may 
not reflect the relative complexity or impact of a single case. One clinic may 
specialise in complex test-case litigation, another in high-volume case repre-
sentation. Clinics have always operated under capped budgets and their funding 
has been frozen since 1993 . In 1995/6 the clinic system cost slightly more that 
10% of the total legal aid budget (Ontario Legal Aid Review, 1997; Clinic 
Funding Submission). 
As not-for-profit corporations, clinics arc managed by elected boards of direc-
tors who are responsible for clinic administration, personnel management (b oards 
are the employers of the staff of each cbnic), financial management, the determi-
nation of legal services to be provided (both the choice of area and the methods 
or strategies to be used) and the evaluation of services.11 The day-to-day manage-
ment of each clinic is the responsibility of the executive director (a member of the 
staff). 
The practices of most geographically based clinics are heavily weighted in the 
areas of social assistance (family benefits, general welfare assistance), workers' 
compensation, employment insurance, Canada pensions, housing (landlord and 
tenant, homelessness), and consumer problems: those areas of law which impact 
pervasively upon the lives of poor persons. The specialty clinics address a range 
of other legal issues of particular significance to their communities. Casework is 
the predominant activity of most clinics. Over the more than two decades of clinic 
operation, some clinics have offered limited services in criminal, family and other 
civil matters on an exceptional basis. Such assistance, however, has generally 
been provided only where clients have little access to other legal services, primar-
ily in remote areas. 
Two recent reports prompted by the fiscal ctisis in OLAP's certificate 
programme strongly supported the goals and operations of Ontario's community 
clinic system and recommended the clinic system as a model for Ontario's legal 
aid system as a whole. The first, Froni Crisis to Reform: A New Legal Aid Plan 
for Ontario (Zemans and Monahan, 1997) was a p1ivately funded report written 
to See CommuniLy Legal Clinics Statistics Discussion Paper, 1996, and letter from Clinic 
Fundi.ng,Staff to Boards and Deans of Law Schools (29 Nov. 1996) [unpubJishedl. The clinic funding 
staff have stated lhal there are rrumy problems in lhe processes used to gather the information reported 
by these statistics. For example, there is a lack of consistency between matters identified as case files 
and those identified as summary advice; the swearing of affidavits may be counted as summary intake 
in one clinic and as a case file in another. The clinic funding staJI have finalised a new scheme for data 
collection, based upon new (and defined) categories to match actual clinic practices better, and this 
new system was put in place in 1998. 
11 These responsibilities are spelled out in the Clinic Funding Operating Manual for clinics and 
in Clinic certificates. 
Can Community Cliltics Survive? 75 
by Osgoode Hall Law School Professors Frederick Zemans and Palrick 
Monahan.12 The second, A Blueprint for Publicly Fwided Legal Services (Ontario 
Legal Aid Review, 1997) (hereinafter McCamus Report); was a report by an inde-
pendent task force funded and appointed by the provincial government. The 
McCanius Report staled that: 
The community clinic model meets many of the goals we have identified for the larger 
legal aid system. The community clinic system can run on a capped budget; it works to 
understand and respond to individual and community needs; it utilizes lawyers, non-
lawyers, public legal education initiatives, and other delivery systems in order to deliver 
services cost-effectively; it prioritizes needs and attempts to meet them strategically; it has 
developed linkages to nonlegal service providers; and it has recently adopted a quality 
assurance program (McCamus Report, 1997: vol. l, c. J 1). 
Both reports strongly endorsed the principle of community governance as funda-
mental to the success of the clinic system and the delivery of poverly law 
services. Each noted the importance of community-elected boards to the inde-
pendence of the clinics, to identifying and prioritising community needs and to 
ensuring accountability to the clinic community. 
Both reports also noted that the present division of responsibilities between the 
Legal Aid Committee and the Clinic Funding Committee does not work very 
weU. The Zemans-Monahan Report stated that the two committees exist as 'two 
solitudes', with decisions by each committee often, if not usually, being made 
without reference to the other. Despite this strong statement, both reports ulti-
mately recommended comparatively modest efforts to improve co-ordination 
between clinics and the overall system. 
The Zemans-Monahan study recommended that the provincial community 
clinic system should be integrated into the same regional board structtu·e they 
recomme!lded for the system as a whole (Zemans and Monahan, 1997:167). The 
study stated that these regional boards should eventually assume the duties and 
responsibilities of the current CFC. The formal relationship between a commu-
nity clinic and its regional board should be established in a detailed operating 
agreement or an equivalent of the current clinic certificate issued by the clinic 
Funding Committee. The McCamus Report recommended even more limited 
structural reforms. Rather than recommending a fu ll integration of the clinic 
system, the McCamus Report recommended thal individual clinics and lhe over-
all clinic system should initiate a multi-year strategic planning process and that 
the Executive Director of each clinic and the Area Dfrector of each OLAP area 
office should sit on each other's boards. Both reports recommended clinic repre-
sentation on the Board of Directors of the proposed new statutory agency. 
The more controversial recommendation of each report was that the clinic 
budget and the system's overaU budget be integrated. The current LegalAidAct 
explicitly separates the ce1tificate programme budget and the clinic programme 
12 The sn1dy was funded by The Donner Canadian Foundation. 
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budget. Each programme has its own distinct statutory funding regime. As a 
result, monies designated for one programme cannot be transferred to the otber.13 
The two reports came to the same conclusion. The Zemans-Monahan Report 
argued that clinics face grave threats to their funding if they remain dependent 
upon direcl grants from the provincial government. They thought that the current 
funding structure, organised around dedicated grants to the Clinic Funding 
Committee, did not sufficiently protect clinics from potentially severe budget 
cutbacks initiated by a provincial government which was intent on cutting costs 
across the board or one which might be resentfu l of the clinics' law reform activ-
ities. They argued that the current funding structure, organised around dedicated 
grants to the clinic structure, unnecessarily nrurnws the political constituency 
supportive of clinic funding (Zemans and Monahan, 1997:105). 
Implicit in both reports was the conclusion that the present funding structure 
has contributed to the 'two solitudes', sepru·ating the clinic and certificate 
programmes. Both reports recommended that the budget integration be phased in 
over a period of years. 
The public, legal aid stakeholders, and the provincial government were very 
supportive of the McCam.us Report's recommendations. Seeing the writing on the 
wall, and itself fed up with the constant headaches of administering a large social 
welfare programme, in February 1998 the Law Society voted overwhelmingly in 
favour of a motion to transfer responsibility for the administration of the Legal 
Aid Plan to an independent statutory corporation (Makin, 1998). They proposed 
that the Board of the new agency should be made up of provincial government 
appointees, Law Society appointees, and a Chair appointed from names recom-
mended by a nominating committee comprised of the Attorney-General, the 
Treasmer of the Law Society, and a mutually agreed third parly. In contrast to 
both the Zemans-Monahan and McCamus recommendations, the Law Society 
model did not explicitly include a clinic representative on the Board of the 
proposed agency. 
Clinic representatives were alarmed by the Law Society model's lack of a 
dedicated clinic or consumer representative on the Board, interpreting the Law 
Society's proposal as a major regression from the McCamus model. Moreover, 
the model obviously ignored many of protections built into the McCamus model, 
including a Board-level clinic committee with dedicated staff. By way of contrast, 
the Association of Community Clinics of Ontario rcconunended a Board and 
agency structure which would considerably dilute the perceived power of judicare 
lJ This separation was intentionai. The authors of the original Clinic Funding Regulation feared 
that 'pooling' the clinic and certificate programme budgets would give the Law Society lhc opportu-
nity to systematically divert clinic resources to the certificate programme. This fear-which many, if 
not most, contemporary clinic supporters share-is founded on a belief lhat the Law Society's 
commitment to private-bar delivery of legal aid would take precedence over its commitment to clin-
ics, especially during times of fiscal restraint. According to this view, the formal separation of the two 
budgets is absolutely critical to the continued survival of the clinics. 
--
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lawyers to restructure or reduce funding for comnrnnity clinks. Tt recommended 
that the Board should have as many non-lawyers as lawyers; thal the Law Society 
should be obligated to appojnt at least one clinic staff p~rsoni and that at least 
three members of the Board should be consumer representatives." lt also recom-
mended the establishment of a Standing Board-level clinic committee with dedi-
cated staff and that the agency should have a dedicated clinic budget, expressed 
as a minimum percentage of the overall legal aid budget. 
To date, the provincial government has not made any final decision on legal 
aid reform, although legislation is expected in the near future. In the present envi-
ronment, clinic representatives are extremely wary of what they fear may be 
significant changes to the long-standing rules governing relationships between 
independent community clinics and the funding authority. They have repeatedly 
stated that the basic governance and funding structure set out in the Grange 
Report were fundamentally sound. They are suspicious of efforts to introduce 
system-wide statistical collection, quality assurance measures, perfo1mance 
measures, or service priorities and consider such initiatives as infringements on 
clinic independence. 
Clinic res~stance to contemporary provincial government social programme 
management techniques (quality assurance, pe1fo1mance measures, co-ordination 
of services, etc.) has led many commentators and stakeholders-including the 
authors of the Zemans-Monahan. and McCamus Reports, clinic funding staff, 
administrators of the certificate programme, and representatives of the provincial 
government- to criticise the community clinic system as being inefficient or 
lacking accountability. The debate has intensified with the capping of certificate 
programme funding and the pressure on government and legal aid administrators 
to improve the cost-efficiency and financial accountability of the entire system. 
The ongoing debate about integration, co-ordination and independence is often 
reduced to a recital of the merits of clinic system 'centralisation' versus the merits 
of relatively unfettered clinic 'autonomy'. Some analysts argue that the CFC's 
funding power gives it authority and responsibility to take a more assertive role 
in co-ordinating clinic planning and operations in the name of promoting 
accountability, efficiency and system-wide co-ordination. Others stress the 
importance of clinic independence, arguing that the CFC's funding power is 
limited by the power of community boards to determine individual seivice prior-
ities and clinic operations. 
More than twenty years after the promulgation of the original Regulation, 
the debate remains vibrant. The paradox of the 1970s Grange model is that the 
same governance structure which has historically protected the clinic system 
against intrusions fromjudicare lawyers and the provincial government has also 
led to significant criticisms of clinics. The same transformative activities (law 
reform, community development) which make the clinic system successful also 
render it politically vulnerable. In fact, the clinic system is in a bind. 
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co-ordination or integration within the larger system without significant conse-
quences; any attempt to justify law reform or community development initia-
tives on the ground of cost-effectiveness, however valid, is a hard sell to the 
same politicians and funders who are often the focus of the clinic's political 
organising. 
Opponents of the clinic model often criticise the focus on law reform. They 
argue that law reform activities are not strictly 'legal', that law reform diverts 
attention and resources away from individual clients, and that it is inappropriate 
to spend public money on 'political' activities. This l~tter argument is particularly 
common within the halls of government. By way of contrast, community clinic 
supporters have argued that law reform is an integral and inevitable part of the 
clinics' work. As Janet Mosher has argued, 'The law reform work of clinics, 
pruticularly in situations where clinics act as a resource to low-income commu-
nities to facilitate their direct participation in law reform activities, enhances 
justice. At a more pragmatic level, participation of low-income communities wm 
result in better laws' (Mosher, 1997:935). Our view is that the long-term success 
of the community clinic model depends upon community clinics retaining their 
law reform focus. The original justification for the law reform mandate remains 
as valid today as in the early 1970s, perhaps even more so. 
Clinics such as the Advocacy Resource Centre for the Handicapped, Justice 
for Children and Youth, the Conectional Law Project, and the Advocacy Centre 
for the Elderly, the unquestioned experts in their respective fields, have made 
invaluable contributions to the development of laws and policies for the better-
ment of all Ontarians. These specialty clinics have been able to devote more 
resources to law reform activities than general service clinics. As well , they are 
more likely to have well established links to social/political movements with the 
same goals. Finally, specialty clinics have been able to develop larger strategies, 
working with others in a larger social/political movement, in order to target 
resources and skills effectively. The Advocacy Resoui·cc Centre for the 
Handicapped, for example, is often viewed as the legal arm of Ontario's disabil-
ity movement. In contrast, while general service clinics often assess and litigate 
cases based upon their view of the long-term strategic impact of that case on a 
class of individuals or group, as a matter of necessity and mandate they ru·e often 
required to restrict the scope of their law refo1m analysis to local activities and 
circumstances. As a result, the impact of their law reform activities is often 
localised. Most importantly, limited funding and the dire needs of their clients put 
incredible pressure on general service clinics to focus on individual casework. 
Important challenges confront the community clinic system's ability to bene-
fit persons with low incomes through law reform. First and foremost, law and li ti-
gation is a limited, discrete tool. Political change generally requires a broad-based 
political strategy, of which legal work and litigation may be but one component. 
Political change also requires development of broad-based community support, 
media, lobbying, etc.-all of which requires more diverse skills than clinics are 
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likely to be able to provide. Secondly, law reform often draws unwanted attention 
to the clinic system, raising the obvious potential for a governmenl to cut off 
funding for clinics in order to silence political critics. In Ontario this potential has 
not been realised to date, despite the grumbling of successive provincial govern-
ments. Thirdly, it is not yet clear how law reform activities can be assessed, quan-
tified or evaluated within 'modern' legal aid administrations which emphasise 
business planning, quality assurance, cost-effectiveness and management 
accountability. 
Although the Provincial Government has not formally announced its plan for 
legal aid reform in Ontario, both the Attorney-General and staff in the provincial 
Ministry of the Attorney-General have been consulting with community clinic 
representatives on the basis that the community clinic system will continue to be 
an important component of the 'new' legal aid system in Ontario; amendments to 
the Province's Legal Aid Act will preserve independent community boards; the 
new legislation will require the new legal aid agency to deliver 'poverty law' 
services and that, at the very least, the board of the new agency will include 
consumer representatives. 
The Government has, however, also announced its intention to improve the 
cost-effectiveness and co-ordination of all the Ontario Legal Aid Plan's services, 
including community clinics. To date, the Government has not announced details 
of these measures. The Government's commitments have been clearly been influ-
enced by, and are consistent with, the recommendations of the McCamus 
Commission. If Ontario's new legal aid legislation matches these commitments, 
the community clinic system in Ontario will have retained an enviable measure 
of legislative protection and stability. 
England and Wales 
English law centres, like their Australian counterparts, have faced many chal-
lenges, first from the profession and secondly from their principal funders. 
Unfortunately for them, they have never managed to attract the all-round support 
afforded to Ontario community legal aid clinics. Yet it all began so optimistically. 
The introduction of judicare in the United Kingdom in the early 1950s contained 
provision for state-salaried lawyers (albeit appointed and controlled by the Law 
Society) to complement the efforts of the private profession in poorer areas. 
However, although retained in the legislation to the present day, the provision was 
never implemented. As a result the law centre movement in England and Wales, 
as in Australia and Ontario, owed its origins to a dissatisfaction with judicarc as 
a means of addressing the legal needs of the poor. With the notable exception of 
the very first law centre to be set up in England and Wales in 1970, in North 
Kensington, the early neighbourhood law centres were attracted by the model of 
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legal needs of the poor, favoured community involvement and independence from 
the private profession (including the professional bodies), were prepared to 
handle test cases in pursuit of law reform, engaged in public legal education and 
relied on a mix of staff lawyers and lay workers. North Kensington, however, 
sought to restrict its efforts largely to individual casework, seeing itself as closely 
akin to private practice. 
Soon after the first law centres were established the Government bowed to the 
pressure of the Society of Labour Lawyers, the Conservative Lawyers Group, the 
National Consumer Council, and the Law Society •. by introducing a greatly 
expanded advice and assistance scheme, known as the 'Green Form' scheme. 
With a simple financial eligibility test and covering any area of English law, it 
was hoped that the Green Form scheme would encourage the private profession 
to use it in poverty law areas, rather than crime and family cases which had do1ru-
nated judicare since its inception. While law centres found imaginative ways of 
using the scheme, e.g. by combining multiple applications with extensions to 
fund the acquisition of experts' reports (Paterson, 1979) the private profession 
showed no similar flexibility. Payments for social welfare law cases rose 
painfully slowly from 10.7 per cent of Green Form accounts in 1975176 to 16.6 
per cent in 1985/86 and 21 per cent in 1990/91 (Goriely, 1994; Smith, 1997b). 
During the same period it was estimated that nearly 60 per cent of the work of 
English and Welsh law centres concerned housing, welfare, employment and 
immigration matters. 
In 1986, the Legal Aid 'Efficiency Scrutiny', established by the Government, 
recommended that large sections of the Green Form scheme be transfeITed to the 
voluntary advice sector. Fierce debate arose and the recommendation was never 
implemented, although it did set the stage for future Government intervention. 
The Scrutiny made another suggestion, subsequently implemented with little 
protest. In 1988, the Government passed the Legal Aid Act 1988 which trans-
ferred the administration of legal aid from the Law Society to the newly created 
Legal Aid Board (LAB) (Lord Chancellor's Office, 1986). In the past, the Law 
Society had wanted control over the administration of legal aid, but by 1986 it 
was somewhat relieved to be absolved of responsibility, given the amount of c1it-
icism it had received from its members (Smith, 1997b: 154). 14 (We noted a siilli-
lar response in 1998 by The Law Society of Upper Canada.) 
Unfortunately, the transfer had no impact on law centre financing. Contrary to 
the position in Australia and Ontario, funding for United Kingdom law centres has 
never been part of the mainstream of publicly funded legal service. Many centres 
were fonded initially from Urban Aid, a partnership between central and local 
government concentrating on inner-city rejuvenation, or by charitable foundations. 
14 Jn one experiment involving microfiche, a legal aid office was paralysed and unable to admin-
ister itself. After the Legal Aid Board took control, the Law Society would not have to won-y about 
such embarrassments. 
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These grants were time-limited, so every centre sooner or later faced major financ-
jng problems. Jn 1975 the Labour Lord Chancellor extended central government 
funding to seven law centres with financial problems but this con.cession was never 
expanded. Surprisingly, the concession was continued under Conservative govern-
ments but only for those seven centres. From 1982 onwards governments took the 
view that law centres were for local authorities to support. The result was an 
unequa] funding base for law centres across England and Wales: law centres 
located within the jurisdiction of Labour councils generally received better fund-
ing than those in Conservative jurisdictions. Such fundi ng inequities were exacer-
bated by the allegedly 'political' activities of some law centres (e.g. community 
organisation or challenging the policies of the local authorities) which tended to 
upset Conservative councils more than Labour ones. Nor was it just the local 
authorities. As early as 1973, the Law Society had begun to criticise law centres 
for 'stirring up political and quasi-political controversy far removed from their 
principal mandate of ensuring equal access to the protection of the law' (Smith, 
1997a:90.5). By 1979, the Labour Government's Royal Commission on Legal 
Services .iwas adding to that c1iticism (Royal Commission on Legal Services, 
1979). The 'Commission appeared hostile to any role for the centres beyond 
increasing provision for casework in social welfare Jaw'. Particularly averse to the 
activist role asserted by the law centre movement, it recommended a new era of 
non-political citizens' law centres (Smith, 1997a:907). The Commission also 
advised that law centre funding should be provided entirely by central government, 
rather than from a variety of funders which included local governments. This 
advice was never heeded since the Conservatives took office shortly after the 
publication of the repo1t. 
The Law Society's opposition to political activities by law centres was symp-
tomatic of their understandable suspicion of the early law centres. The centres 
espoused progressive fo1ms of lawyering which were unsettling to traditionalists, 
and the fact that they offered their services free of charge was perceived as unfair 
competition. Operating a law centre required a waiver from the Law Society of 
the professional rules against advertising and sha1ing fees. This gave the Society 
the ability to control where and when a new centre could be established. Jn 1975 
a group of local practitioners in Hillingdon, outraged by the imminent funding of 
a local law centre, pressed the Law Society into refusing to grant waivers to 
lawyers working in the centre. The Government intervened on the side of the law 
centres, threatening legislation. Eventually an accommodation was reached under 
pressure from the Labour Lord Chancellor. In future, provided centres agreed not 
to compete with private practitioners in such areas as adult crime, matrimonial 
and personal injury litigation, probate and conveyancing, 15 the Law Society 
would no longer use its powers to grant waivers as a means of controlling the 
setting up of law centres (Smith, 1997b:152). In truth this compromise suited 
IS This division of labour parallels that in Ontario between clinics and the certificate scheme. 
l 
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both sides since few centres saw their mission as requiring them to invade the 
traditional ru:eas of private practice. Moreover it soon became accepted that UK 
law centres, by referring such work to the private profession, generated income 
for the private profession rather than taking it from them. 
However, the division of labour did not solve the long-term funding crisis 
facing the law centre movement. Gradually they were forced to turn more and 
more to individual casework funded by legal aid rather than the more innovative 
forms of poverty lawyering which they had espoused in the early years. Indeed, 
the amount of casework a law centre pursues is largely determined by the exis-
tence of other sources of legal aid. Following the deregulation of the profession 
in the 1980s the Law Society lost its ability to curtail the work of law centres 
through waivers. This has created the intriguing scenario of law centres moving 
into the areas of work previously colonised by the p1ivate profession. It remains 
to be seen to what extent the dependence on casework encourages moves in that 
direction. To date, most centres have tried to maintain a broader concept of 
'access to justice': 'Use of the [Green Form] scheme by Law Centres is indeed 
regarded with a certain ambivalence by the people who work in them ... [W]hile 
'Green Form' work (and other legally aided work) provided a useful source of 
revenue, it was not regarded as a mainstream activity of Law Centres. It was even 
in some respects viewed as representing something of a diversion from the main 
work that staff wished to undertake [sic]' (Ba1dwin and Hill, 1988: 102). 
The Law Centres Federation, the voice of the law centre movement, views 
casework as merely one aspect of the function of a law centre. Indeed, as reflected 
in the Federation's definition of a law centre, casework is often considered only 
a minor aspect in the provision of services by law centres: 'Law Centres aim to 
make the most efficient use of their resources and so have developed several 
methods of work to achieve the best results. These include case work, participat-
ing in the process of legal reform, campaigning, education work, development 
work and resourcing (providing a valuable source of inf01mation and support for 
all sorts of agencies and groups)' (Law Centres Federation, 1991). 
Law centres have structured themselves to deal with the need for flexibility, by 
generally encouraging horizontal power structures, self-servicing, skill-shaiing 
and community control. Nonetheless, these values are not all manifested in every 
centre. As in Australia, community control has proved elusive in the UK, either 
because the salaried staff take de facto charge of policy or because some local 
autho1ities insist on a hierarchical management structure as a requirement for 
funding. 
Despite financial difiiculties, the number of law centres grew from 28 in 1979 
to 56 in 1986. The number of citizens' advice bureaux (CABx), lay advice centres 
grew from 473 in 1966 to 869 in 1986. In the same time period the volume of 
enquiries at CABx had grown from 1.3 million to 6.8 million. In the 1970's, CABx 
had also experimented, on a pilot basis, with the employment of solicitors; in some 
cases they also combined efforts with law centres. Between 1990/1and1995/6. the 
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amount of money received by law centres for 'Green Forms' increased from £1 
million to £1.9 million. However, 'Green Form' payments to the private profession 
in social welfare areas increased by a greater margin in the 6ame period. Similarly, 
funding to advice agencies that employed lawyers increased fro'm £202,000 to 
£1.2 million (Smith, 1997a:912). Moreover, in 1996, as part of a pilot project, the 
LAB dispersed another £2.6 million to advice agencies that did not employ 
lawyers. Since 1986, CABx and the private profession have come to attract an ever 
greater percentage of legal aid funds flowing towards social welfare law. Three 
principal reasons account for the shift in the delivery capacity of CABx and private 
practitioners. First, private practitioners-particularly those in niche social welfare 
firms (often near law centres and staffed by ex-law centre workers) began to use 
the 'Green Form' scheme extensively for social welfare work (Gorie1y, 1994). 
They also colonised special interest groups influential within the field.16 Secondly, 
advice centres have overtaken law centres in terms of volume of casework. Finally, 
high-level test cases have become much more a specialty of national not-for-profit 
pressure groups such as the Child Poverty Action Group, Shelter (a housing 
campaigning organisation), and Liberty (formerly the National Council for Civil 
Liberties) (Smith, 1997a:897,913). 17 It must be remembered, however, that the law 
centre movement does not generally measure its success by its volume of casework 
or by the number of individuals served. 
In recent years, Jegal aid policies have begun to change. The advent of fran-
chising (see Paterson and Sherr, Chapter 10, below) offered new opportunities for 
funding for law centres. Franchising is a system that rewards provjders who can 
satisfy criteria of competence in their work as well as adhering to key practice 
management standards (Legal Aid Board, 1989:6). 
A number of law centres became franchised. However, in a White Paper (UK, 
1996) published by the Conservative Government, franchising evolved into the 
concept of conlracting. In future, only providers with quality assured contracts 
with the Legal Aid Board will be able to provide 'Green Form' work. The alloca-
tion of the contracts would be based on geographic assessments of need and 
competition between service providers. While franchises were not intended to be 
exclusive (i.e. any number of service providers could qualify to be franchised) 
contracting is effectively exclusive insofar as there are a fini te number of 
contracts available. 
Sho1tly after the publication of the Conservative White Paper, the Labour Party 
was voted into government. While the new Government adopted the Conservative 
plans for contracting, Labour has also made a commitment to a community legal 
aid service (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1998). 
16 Organisations such as the Housing Law Practitioners Group or the lrrunigration Law 
Practitioners Association, largely dominated by private practitioners, arc very influential. 
17 In other jurisdictions, the function of these groups may be handled by specialty legal aid clin-
ics. However, in England and Wales there exist both specialty clinics and lawyer-employing pressure 
groups. 
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While the proposals have not been passed into law at the ti me of writing, the 
Government seems committed to transfenfog 'Green Form' resources towards 
advice for social welfare law. This will result in opportunities for law centres and 
advice agencies to obtain exclusive contracts to provide advice on aspects of 
social welfare law (ibid.). While this wi11 place them in competition with the 
private sector, it will only be with private firms specialising in social welfare Jaw, 
of which there are relatively few. 
Overview and conclusion 
We return now to the questions that began this Chapter: can independent commu-
nity clinics survive in a world in which governments increasingly emphasise 
centralised decision-making and determination of service priorities, cost-effec-
tiveness, financial and operational accountability, quality assurance and co-ordi-
·nation of service providers? Can clinic supporters adopt strategies to ensure that 
they are able to retain their independence and uniqueness in the face of counter-
vailing pressures to 'bureaucratise' or centrally manage their operations? Our 
review of the clinic systems in Australia, England and Wales, and the Ontario case 
study demonstrate that there are no simple answers to these questions. 
Law Centres in England and Wales have never been as significant an element 
in the legal aid system as the legal clinic in Australia or Ontario. The historic lack 
of substantial funding for Law Centres has considerably limited their develop-
ment and effectiveness. Moreover, Law Centres are now being tempted to 
compete with the private bar and the advice sector for limited funds. Australian 
Community Legal Centres have not suffered the same lack of funding and central 
suppo1t as England's law centres. There arc, however, major cha11enges which 
threaten to alter fundamentally the nature of Community Legal Centres, includ-
ing the focus on centralised planning and the concurrent lack of consumer or 
Legal Centre representation on the bodies governing legal aid. Of the three j uris-
dictions, the Ontario community clinic system appears at present best placed to 
meet the current challenges effectively. Indeed, the reforms which have been 
suggested by the Ontario Government do not fundamentally change the gover-
nance or operations of the community clinic system. In fact, they may strengthen 
it. 
To what can we attribute the comparative success of Ontario's community 
clinic system? Several factors can be identified. These include the Province's 
long, successful experience with community clinics; the size and the sophistica-
tion of the system; the protection afforded clinics by the Grange governance and 
funding structure; the fact that political attention in recent years has been focused 
on the 'crisis' in OLAP's certificate programme; the clinics' success at building 
community networks; continued support for clinics among legal and bureaucratic 
elites (many of whom worked in clinics as students); and the strong endorsement 
·:. 
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of Ontario's clinic system by domestic and internationa] observers. 
Ontario's experience offers valuable insights as to the conditions required for 
the continuance and future success of the cornmunity~based legal clinics. It 
suggests that community legal clinics can survive, and perhaps thrive, in the face 
of contemporary challenges, but that their chances of survival can be enhanced if 
certain prerequisites are present: 






profession, government bureaucracies and the governing bodies of legal aid 
programmes; 
legal aid systems should maintain a clear division of labour between the 
private profession and the clinics; 
funding sources should be stable and secure; 
independent community clinic boards should be preserved; 
legal aid plans should have specific administrative structures dedicated to 
clinic issues; and 
community clinics should adopt new management techniques, including qual-
ity assurance programmes, performance measures, and strategic planning, 
despite expressed concerns about their relevancy to the clinic model. 
In many respects, the issues defined above, though specific to the Ontario case, 
identify critical aspects of a continuing clinic movement whatever the jurisdic-
tion. For this reason, it is interesting to examine the issues in more depth and to 
extrapolate as to the general applicability of the issues and concerns. Each of 
these issues is discussed briefly below. 
Clinics should have netvvorks of supporters within their communities, the legal 
profession, government bureaucracies and the governing bodies of legal aid 
programmes 
The community clinic model has developed a wide range of supporters in each 
clinic's respective community, in the Province's legal profession, and in the 
justice system's bureaucracy. This network has been vital to preserving clinic 
funding throughout changes in governments and political philosophies. 
Community clinics, in both Australia and Ontario, have been effective in mobil-
ising support at key moments to lobby in support of maintaining clinic funding. 
(By contrast, since 1995 Ontario's funding for most community service providers 
has been cut dramaticaJly and welfare rates have been reduced by over 20 per 
cent.) Representation of clinics on state or national governing bodies drawn from 
local clinic boards ensures that clinic issues and perspectives will be heard by the 
legal aid authority's highest levels. Moreover, it ensures that the perspective of a 
person with experience in community-based service delivery will be integral to 
poJi.cy discussions. 
From a clinic perspective, the appointment of a member (or members) either 
representative of, or associated with community clinics would obviously be the 
:' 
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best governance model. As discussed earlier, the recent changes in Austral ia seem 
to be moving away from clinic or conununity leadership in legal aid adminjstra-
tion. Unlike the previous state legal aid commission, the board of directors of 
Vict01ia Legal Aid does not include any nominee from community legal centres 
or the community. 
Legal aid systems should maintain a clear division of labour between the private 
profession and the clinics 
There are two straightforward reasons for ensuring a.clear division between clinic 
services andjudicare services: fear of being 'overwhelmed' by criminal and family 
cases, and fear of competition from the private bar. In Ontario, clinic supporters 
argue in favour of a clear division between clinic services and judicare services 
because of a fear that clinics could be overwhelmed by either criminal or family 
cases, effectively eliminating their poverty law focus. Hence, clinic supporters in 
Ontario have always argued for a 'bright line' dividing clinic and judicare practice. 
In Australia, England and Wales, and Quebec the situation is reversed. The govern-
ments of these jurisdictions have intentionally promoted competition between 
alternative services providers as a means to lower costs. Rather than being overrun 
by criminal and family cases, Community Legal Centres and Law Centres are 
facing competition from the private bar on their own te1ms. Increasing munbers of 
private lawyers and other service providers now provide poverty law services.18 
One way to overcome the threat that this poses is to espouse a flexible, statu-
tory definition of 'Poverty Law'. L9 Definitions which arc overly specific run the 
risk that the board will refuse to authorise services being provided in areas not 
mentioned in the legislative definition. Just as importantly, a specific definition 
can be written and interpreted to preclude law reform activities. General defini-
tions, on the other hand, give community boards the flexibility to respond to such 
local needs as they deem appropriate. 
Funding sources should be stable and secure 
Clearly the Australian and Ontario clinics started with the major advantage of 
central funding which has always been denied their English counterparts. 
However, as US legal services (see Chapters l and 2) have found, central funding 
can be lost where government and community support falter. Equally, hostility 
from the local legal profession or local government can jeopardise local funding, 
as several English law centres have discovered. 
18 As discussed above, the Commonwealth Government in Auslralia is increasingly shifting 
responsibility for social programmes such as legal aid to community legal centres and other social 
organisations. This has resulted in a greater demand on both the fi nancial and personnel resources of 
community legal centres. It is anticipated that case-loads in community legal centres will increase. 
19 For example, the Association of Community Legal Clinics of Ontario proposed the following 
definition to the Ontario Government during the Government's legal aid consultation: 'legal :issues 
which particularly impact on low-income communities, and which are identified by those communi-
ties as being of critical importance to them ' (Ontario Legal Aid Review, 1997). 
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Independent community boards should be preserved 
It is, or should be, axiomatic that the character of corhinun.ity .clinics cannot 
survive without independent community boards. The' recent Ontario Legal Aid 
Review in Ontario, like others that have examined community clinics, stated that 
'community governance is of fundamental importance to the mandate and opera-
tions of the community clinic system and the delivery of "poverty law" services' 
(McCamus Report, 1997: 193). The Report described the advantages of commu-
nity governance succinctly: 'Community boards have historically been important 
in ensuring independence from both the [Ontario Legal Aid Plan) and the provin-
cial government; in assisting the clinic in identifying and prioritizing community 
needs; in ensuting accountability to their communities for the nature and quality 
of services provided; and, through their board members, in providing vital link-
ages to other community services' (ibid. 193-4). 
Moreover, independent boards offer several advantages to governments inter-
ested in saving legal aid costs: independent clinics hire their own staff, reducing 
government payrolls and operations; the government is not legally liable for 
lawsuits against the clinics; and community boards donate considerable time and 
skills which might otherwise have to be paid for. 
Legal aid plans should have specific administrative structures dedicated to clinic 
issues 
The experience in Ontai.io and Australia over the last 20 years has proven the 
immeasurable value of having an administrntive structure within the lai.·ger legal 
aid system specifically dedicated to clinic issues and programmes. Clinic admi n-
istration is fundamentally different to the administration of other pa1ts of a legal 
aid programme, especially judicare. In the absence of a dedicated administrative 
structure, there is a real chance that clinic issues will be lost within the larger legal 
aid debate. A dedicated administrative bureaucracy can provide sophisticated 
policy analysis appropriate to, and reflective of, the community clinic system. 
Adoption of modern management techniques 
At this point, we must stress the distinction between adopting modern manage-
ment techniques (such as quality assurance programmes, performance measures 
and business planning) and centralised, hierarchical control of service p1io1ities 
and delivery mechanisms. In an era in which government and legal aid adminis-
trators emphasise the need for cost-effectiveness and financial accountability, 
clinic resistance to the adoption of modern management techniques is self-defeat-
ing. Future funding for clinics is clearly dependent upon clinics both being able to 
deliver their services cost-effectively and their ability to prove that they can do so. 
Our consideration of the history and current developments in Australia, 
Canada (Ontai.fo) and the United Kingdom have Jed to certain predictions 
concerning the future of the clinic movement. Despite current problems, we 
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conclude on an optimistic note. Though judicare represents the predonrinant 
model of service delivery in the United Kingdom and Ontario, and despite the 
movement away from communily-based social programmes, community legal 
clinics have generally developed slrong roots and distinctive structures that have 
a unique capacity to respond to the needs and agendas of the three jurisdictions 
studied. We anticipate that these strengths will allow them to continue to develop 
and to respond to the expectations and needs of low-income citizens in each of 
the three countries. 
